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HOW THE MAINSTREAMING PRESUMPTION BECAME THE
INCLUSION MANDATE
Adam B. Diaz*
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion that the public school system has a duty to provide any type of
education for students with disabilities is a rather recent phenomenon. From the
founding of the United States through the late 1960s, the treatment of people with
disabilities, children and adult alike, in this country and around the world, was based
on the archaic and misguided assumption that the disadvantages faced by such
persons "were the inevitable result of limitations stemming from the disability itself,
rather than from societal barriers or prejudice."' As a result, the education of children
with special needs was left to their parents, some of whom in turn placed their
children in institutional environments whereas others provided home schooling.2 The
Civil Rights Movement, and the racial integration of the public school system that
followed, provided the necessary impetus for change in America.3 Parents and
advocates of children with special needs perceived the holding of Brown v. Board of
Education4 to be as groundbreaking and revolutionizing as African American
families and civil rights activists.5
The efforts of such parents and disability advocates ultimately prompted federal
legislative action; Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) into law in 1970.6 The mandate of IDEA, stipulating that all students are
entitled to a "free and appropriate public education"7 in the "least restrictive
environment," 8 has forever improved the educational opportunities afforded to
children with disabilities. The statistics that bear out this fact are staggering. Less
than 800,000 students reportedly received special education services in public
schools in 1976-1977.9 While the Department of Education (DOE) reported that, for
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Notre Dame Law School.
1. Laudan Aron & Pamela Loprest, Disability and the Education System, 22 THE FUTURE OF CHILD. 97,
99 (2012), available at http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/2201_FullJournal.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Crossley, Note, Inclusion: A New Addition to Remedy a History of Inadequate
Conditions and Terms, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 239, 241-42 (2000).
3. Ruth Colker, The Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789, 792 (2006).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. See Colker, supra note 3, at 792,
6. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1999) (originally enacted as
the Education for the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970)).
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). (As interpreted by the Supreme Court in Board ofEducation v. Rowley (458 U.S.
176 (1982))).
8. Id.
9. See Colker, supra note 3, at 794-795.
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the 2008 school year, 5,660,491 students with disabilities received instruction in
general education classrooms for at least part of the day.' 0 The mandate, therefore,
has had an indelible impact on public education in this country and continues to
influence the educational policy decisions of today. Over the course of the last thirty
years, the least restrictive environment standard has been fleshed out by the courts,]1
and further refined by Congress to require the integration of children with disabilities
into general educational classrooms to the "maximum extent appropriate."l 2 As a
result, the integration presumption emerged. Subsequent litigation in the various
federal circuit courts has strengthened the core IDEA requirements.13
The origins, purpose, and sources of the integration presumption have been, and
continue to be, frequently and furiously debated among educational policy scholars
and disability advocates. This is the direct result of inconsistent jurisprudence at the
federal circuit level regarding the degree of deference to which decisions made by
schools regarding placement of students with special needs should be given and the
extent of the presumption.14 As the Supreme Court has never directly defined the
specific requirements of the least restrictive environment, nor provided a framework
for school districts to apply, various tests have emerged at the federal circuit level
that have had the effect of shifting the integration presumption to an inclusion
presumption. The two concepts, while often used synonymously, are in reality quite
different. Integration, or mainstreaming, involves the placement of students with
special needs into a regular education classroom for part of the day for the benefit of
social interaction,15 whereas inclusion refers to the practice of placing students with
special needs in a regular education classroom for most of the day.16 Many of the
federal circuit courts have similarly misapplied the Rowley Court's interpretation of
what constitutes a "free and appropriate public education" when determining the
suitable degree of integration.
This Note will present a proposal for a new framework under which the
presumption can return to its original function and objective. Below, Part I discusses
the history of special education in this country and the movement towards integration
of students with special needs in the public school system. Part II introduces the
Individuals with Disabilities Act, its legislative history and its mandates, as well as
how it impacts the inclusion debate. Part III provides an overview of the judicial
response to the IDEA and the integration presumption, beginning with the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Rowley, before exploring the subsequent decisions at
the federal court level that have skewed the legislative objectives behind the IDEA.
In conclusion, Part IV concludes with a proposed framework for the integration
10. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH
DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA 2 (2010) [hereinafter THIRTY-FIvE YEARS OF PROGRESS], available at
http://www2.ed.gov/aboutloffices/list/osers/idea35/history/idea-35-history.pdf
11. See infta Part I.B.l.
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
13. See infra Part III.C.
14. See infra Part IV.A-D.
15. Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 2006 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 189,
198 (2006).
16. Id.
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presumption going forward, arguing that equal weight should be given to both the
integration presumption and the determinations made by local educators; the general
presumption should be in favor of mainstreaming the student during all non-academic
school activities, while a much more individualized assessment ought to be
incorporated when determining the student's placement for academic classes.
II. HISTORY
A. The Early American Experience
A review of human history reveals a rather disturbing trend of public disregard
for the care and education of children with disabilities. For the most part, such
children were consigned to the care of their families and were never afforded the
opportunity to receive any formal education." There were very few attempts to
establish formal education programs for children with disabilities prior to the late
eighteenth century, and those efforts were limited to the deaf and blind.'"
The education of children with special needs in the United States followed this
pattern. The first schools established in this country for persons with disabilities were
those for the deaf. In 1817, Thomas Hopkins Gallaudet established the first American
Asylum for the Education of the Deaf and Dumb' 9 and, by 1860, twenty-three
additional schools for the deaf had been founded.20 The proliferation of such schools
prompted education reformers to begin to develop institutions designed for children
with other disabilities. 21 However, placement in these more general institutions
provided little opportunity for substantive development and these facilities more
closely resembled prisons rather than schools. 22 The care provided took place in
"institutional settings" 23 and was often "custodial" in nature. 24 Strict segregation of
the mentally retarded was encouraged by social Darwinist misgivings-"that society
must be protected from the gene pool of 'the feeble minded."' 25 Unfortunately, some
took social Darwinist theory to its furthest logical conclusion: 26the eugenics
movement.27 The eugenics movement viewed the disabled as "subhuman," and
advocated that they should neither be accepted in the world nor permitted to
17. Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Special Education Inclusion and the Courts: A Proposal for
a New Remedial Approach, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 523, 527 (1996).
18. Id. at 527-28 ("The first documented attempt to educate special students occurred in 1555, when the
Spanish monk Pedro Ponce de Leon taught a small group of deaf students to read, write, speak, and to master
the basic academic subjects. Other isolated educational programs-for the deaf and blind remained the only forms
of organized special education until the late eighteenth century.").
19. Id. at 528.
20. OLIVER SACKS, SEEING VOICES: A JOURNEY INTO THE WORLD OF THE DEAF 24 (1989).
21. Rebell & Hughes, supra note 17, at 528 ("New Haven formed a class for misbehaved students in 1871;
New York created a class for 'unruly boys' in 1871 and one for truants in 1874; and Cleveland established a
class for students with discipline problems late in the 1870's.").
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997)
27. Rebell & Hughes, supra note 17, at 528-29 n.32.
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procreate. 28
It was not until 1896, in Providence, Rhode Island, that special education classes
for children with disabilities were established in public schools. 29 While this
development demonstrated some degree of progress, late nineteenth and early
twentieth-century state supreme court decisions thwarted this expansion in many
jurisdictions. In these opinions, state supreme courts frequently accorded substantial
deference to the determinations made by local school officials which excluded certain
disabled children from the public school system,30 stating that any disabled child's
interest in receiving a public school education "cannot be insisted upon when [the
child's] presence therein is harmful to the best interests of the school." 31 This
jurisprudential approach often had the effect of forcing families to home-school their
disabled children or to place them in institutions for disabled persons. 32
The public education model began to experience a transformation around the turn
of the twentieth century. Brought on by the movement towards compulsory education
and the influx in the number of children immigrating to the United States, enrollment
in public schools increased exponentially and forced public school systems to
dramatically alter the organization of their schools. 33 Public school administrators
throughout the country began to develop and adopt "highly formalized procedures
where students were expected to advance through a graded sequence of instruction,
based on their age or degree of academic achievement." 34 This was particularly true
for large urban school districts. 35 Students who could not keep up intellectually, who
impeded the academic progress of other students, or who required an inordinate
amount of individual instruction were classified as "mentally deficient." 36 These
students were removed from regular classrooms and placed in special education
classrooms.3 7 Yet the results of a 1921 survey reveal the degree to which the
classification process was plagued by xenophobic and classist anxieties: 75% of
special education students, those characterized as "mentally deficient," in the New
28. Id. The "nadir of this movement" was the enactment of compulsory sterilization statutes by state
legislatures, which were upheld by the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Id. In that opinion,
Justice Holmes included the often recited phrase that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough." Buck, 274
U.S. at 207.
29. Rebell & Hughes, supra note 17, at 528-29. Once again the Europeans preceded the Americans: "the
first special public school class for 'defective children' was formed in Halle, Prussia in 1895." Id at 529 n.33.
30. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864 (Mass. 1893) (affirming the local school
committee's decision to exclude a mentally retarded child from the public school system 1); State ex rel Beattie
v. Bd. ofEduc., 172 N.W. 153 (Wisc. 1919) (affirming the local school committee's decision to exclude a child
inflicted with paralysis).
31. Beattie, 172 N.W. at 154.
32. See Crossley, supra note 2, 241-42.
33. Id. at 242.
34. Rebell & Hughes, supra note 17, at 529.
35. Id
36. Id.
37. Crossley, supra note 2, at 242-43; see also Rebell & Hughes, supra note 17, at 529-30 ("The key
concern was to remove children who did not meet their classmates' and teachers' conception of normality from
the general classroom, and not on the appropriateness of the services they would receive; it was these children
who were frequently funneled into 'special' classes and academic tracks.").
2013-14] 223
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York City public school system had foreign-born parents.3 8
The number of special education classrooms continued to increase through the
1950s, 39 stimulated primarily by developments in medicine.40 These advancements
in medical technology enabled more children with disabilities to survive early
childhood and correspondingly increased the demand for services for the disabled.41
However, despite the growing number of classrooms, the context, design, and quality
of the special educational services provided by public school systems remained
woefully insufficient. Special education classrooms continued to be located primarily
in separate facilities. 42 Further, the absence of any federal legislation specifically
protecting the civil or constitutional rights of Americans with disabilities prior to
1970 significantly affected the quality and extent of special education opportunities
throughout the country.43 The statistics plainly demonstrate the disparity in treatment
of Americans with disabilities through the 1960s: by 1967, almost 200,000 disabled
children and adults were being housed in state institutions.44 Poor, rural, and minority
students with disabilities faced an even greater chance of being institutionalized.45
The combined effect of the deference by the courts to local school administrators as
well as the absence of any comprehensive federal laws on the subject resulted in only
one in five children with disabilities receiving some form of a public education. 46
B. The Movement Toward Integration
The movement towards integration, instigated by advocacy groups and
educational reformers, was substantially influenced by the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Brown v. Board ofEducation.4 7 In Brown, the Court held that
the practice of segregating schools on the basis of race creates an inherently unequal
system of education and thus is unconstitutional.48 Advocates and reformers striving
for the integration of students with special needs into the regular educational
environment analogized that the use of separate facilities for students with disabilities
was as patently unequal as racial segregation.49
38. Crossley, supra note 32, at 242 n.17.
39. See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 17, at 530-31 ("Special education expanded even more dramatically
in the decades following World War II... . [T]here was an 'explosion of new special classes and special schools'
that increased the number of students enrolled in specialized programs from 442,000 in 1948 to 1,666,000 in
1963.").
40. Crossley, supra note 2, at 242 n.16.
4 1. Id.
42. Mark T. Keaney, Comment, Examining Teacher Attitudes Toward Integration: Important
Considerations for Legislatures, Courts, and Schools, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 827, 832 (2012).
43. Laudan Aron & Pamela Loprest, supra note 1, at 99.
44. THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 10, at 3.
45. Sarah E. Farley, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing Classroom Placement of Students with
Disabilities under the IDEA, 77 WASH. L. REv. 809, 811 (2002).
46. See THIRTY-FIvE YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 10, at 3.
47. Id.
48. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
49. See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 17, at 532-33 ("[S] ome mainstreaming proponents argued
segregated facilities for children with disabilities for children with disabilities were unequal, providing
substandard and inadequate education resources. Others maintained that, even where adequate resources were
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Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, federal legislation was introduced that
provided improved programs and services for the disabled.5 0 Examples of such initial
legislation include the Training of Professional Personnel Act of 1959, providing
training programs for school administrators and teachers of students with disabilities;
the Captioned Films Act of 1958, which initially provided for subtitled versions of
popular films for the deaf but was expanded to include support for the production and
distribution of educational films; and the Teachers of the Deaf Act of 1961, providing
training for instructional personnel for deaf children.5  A major development
occurred in 1966, when Congress amended The Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) to include a new Title VI. 52 Title VI allocated funds
for the improvement of educational opportunities for handicapped children, the
definition of which included virtually all children with disabilities. 53 However, in
1970, Congress repealed Title VI of ESEA and replaced it with the Education of the
Handicapped Act (EHA).54 The EHA conditioned grants to the states on assurances
that the states would create and implement "programs to 'meet the special educational
and related needs of handicapped children."' 55 Despite the lack of a mandate that
states provide education to all children with disabilities and the insufficient
specification regarding the manner in which such children should be educated, the
law constituted an important moment in the disability movement.56
While the EHA provided resources for the education of students with learning
disabilities, such instruction often occurred in segregated classrooms and facilities,
and was frequently ineffective.5 7 During the Congressional hearings that preceded
the enactment of IDEA, it was established that up to half of all students with special
needs were not receiving sufficient services, and more than one million other children
with disabilities were forced to remain at home or in institutions that provided
limited, if any, formal education.58
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, special education reformers and
advocates began to seriously consider the psychological effects of removing
"defective" students from the regular classroom setting.59 Approximately eight
provided, any segregation on perceived disability was inherently unequal.").
50. Id. at 4-5.
51. Id. at 4; cf id. at 5 ("By 1968, the federal government had supported: (1) [t]raining for more than
30,000 special education teachers and related specialists; (2) [c]aptioned films viewed by more than 3 million
persons who were deaf; and (3) [e]ducation for children with disabilities in preschools and in elementary,
secondary, and sate-operated schools across the country.").
52. Colker, supra note 3, at 803.
53. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750, §602,80 Stat. 1191,
1204 (repealed 1971) ("As used in this title, the term 'handicapped children' includes mentally retarded, hard
of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, crippled, or other
health impaired children who by reason thereof require special education and related services.")
54. Colker, supra note 3, at 803.
55. Id. Additionally, "[t]his new law sought to consolidate the existing programs and establish[] the
Bureau of Education of the Handicapped within the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW)." Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Farley, supra note 47, at 811; Colker, supra note 3, at 803.
58. See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 17, at 531.
59. Id.
2252013-14]
Journal of Legislation
million special needs students were being educated in the public school system by
that time, although the system was essentially bifurcated on the basis of disability.60
The education of children with disabilities at that time involved its own isolated
system, consisting of separate facilities, administration, funding sources, as well as
teacher certification requirements, instructional expectations, and strategies. 61 The
corresponding stigma that the separation created prompted educators and advocates
to determine whether, and to what extent, children with disabilities could be placed
in a regular education classroom.62 Authors Michael A. Rebell and Robert L. Hughes
note in their article, Special Education Inclusion and the Courts: A Proposal for a
New Remedial Approach, "[A]s special education became a more prominent part of
American education, reports of successfully mainstreaming autistic, severely
learning disabled, mentally retarded, or cerebrally ill children increasingly appeared
in the literature." 63 Based on these studies and reports, reformers and advocates began
to challenge the system of segregation, while asserting that special needs students
could be educated in a regular classroom. 64
As skepticism about the purported "benefits" of educating children with special
needs in segregated facilities became more widespread,65 the issue of integration
began to reach the courts. Beginning in the early 1970s, legal challenges to the
segregated education of children with special needs began to appear in a number of
state and federal courts.66 Two federal district court cases, one in Pennsylvania and
the other in the District of Columbia, involved plaintiffs alleging that the school
systems' practice of excluding individuals with disabilities from their schools
violated state law and federal law, namely the Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.67
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (P.A.R. C.) 68 concluded with a consent agreement between the parties
that was subsequently approved and adopted by the district court.69 Clause Seven of
60. Id.
6 1. Id.
62. Crossley, supra note 2, at 243; see also Rebell & Hughes, supra note 17, at 531-32 ("Because separate
educational programs for students with disabilities historically resulted largely from a desire to remove
'defective' students from the regular classroom setting, separation of special education children created stigma.
Even in the early days of special education in the public schools, many educators expressed doubts about the
wisdom of establishing a separate educational system for children with disabilities and postulated that students
identified with disabilities could be educated with their nondisabled peers.").
63. Crossley, supra note 2, at 243 ("[E]ducators conducted various experiments to determine if disabled
children could be placed in a regular educational environment. These experiments proved to be relatively
successful, sparking a movement toward the inclusion of children with disabilities into general classrooms.").
64. See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 17, at 532.
65. See id. at 533. This skepticism "was reinforced by emerging research which questioned the reliability
of intelligence testing, documented the detrimental impact of the stigma associated with removing children from
the general education classrooms, and noted most programs failed to return children to the mainstream
environment." Id.
66. Id at 534.
67. See Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Mills v. Bd.
of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
68. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
69. Id. at 1257-58.
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the consent decree included the first articulation of the integration presumption:
It is the Commonwealth's obligation to place each mentally retarded child
in a free, public program of education and training appropriate to the
child's capacity, within the context of a presumption that, among the
alternative programs of education and training required by statute to be
available, placement in a regular public school class is preferable to
placement in a special public school class and placement in a special public
school class is preferable to placement in any other type of program of
education and training.70
The presumption was indicative of the expansive nature of the consent decree, as it
"went well beyond the court's findings." 71 As Ruth Colker states in her article, The
Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, "[Clause Seven] created a presumption
that placement in a regular class was preferable to placement in a special education
class. It did not merely require the admission of children with disabilities to the public
schools; it suggested where they should receive their education within the
building."72 Yet notably absent from the court's opinion was any justification for its
novel presumption. 73 Regardless of this omission, the presumption thus created has
come to play a defining role in determining the placement of special needs students
in public school classrooms.
The legacy of the P.A.R.C. and Mills v. Board of Education74 decisions ensure
that children with disabilities will not be excluded wholesale and indiscriminately
from the public education system and, where any degree of exclusion or differential
treatment is being considered, due process is to be provided.75 Compelled by these
landmark decisions, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.76 This
legislation further reflected the shifting attitudes towards the treatment of Americans
with disabilities, as it was the first federal law to declare that the exclusion or
segregation of an individual with a disability constituted discrimination. 77 Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act specifically established and extended civil rights to
disabled persons,7 8 "challeng[ing] the assumption that disadvantages faced by people
with disabilities, such as low educational attainment or unemployment, were the
inevitable result of limitations stemming from the disability itself rather than from
societal barriers or prejudice." 79 Given the fact that nearly every public school
receives federal funding, the Rehabilitation Act made substantial inroads into the
70. Id. at 1260.
71. Colker, supra note 3, at 804.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
75. MARK C. WEBER ET AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (3d ed. 2010).
76. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.).
77. See id. § 504; Laudan Aron & Pamela Loprest, supra note 1, at 99.
78. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504.
79. Laudan Aron & Pamela Loprest, supra note 1, at 99.
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education context by mandating that each and every child was entitled to an equal
educational opportunity, irrespective of disability.80 Thus, Section 504 provided
increased access to the public education system for children with disabilities through
the removal of both intentional and unintentional barriers and set the stage for
Congress to establish substantive educational rights.8'
III. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
A. Legislative History
The initial congressional response to the inclusion issue resulted in the enactment
of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA)82 in 1975. According
to a Senate Report, the EAHCA was created as a "comprehensive mechanism which
[would] insure. . . maximum benefits to handicapped children and their parents." 84
Through recognition of the fact that "[d]isability is a natural part of the human
experience and in no way diminishes the right of individuals to participate in or
contribute to society,"85 Congress endorsed a fundamental change to the manner in
which society views and treats people with disabilities. In 1990, the EAHCA was
amended and renamed the IDEA. 86 Despite the change in name and numerous
amendments over the years, the major provisions of the IDEA have remained intact
since 1975.8 Improving educational opportunities for children with disabilities
continues to be "an essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for
individuals with disabilities."88
Upon its enactment, the EAHCA included three implicit changes in the law, each
having a profound effect on the education of children with special needs. First, the
Act improved the manner in which children with disabilities were identified and
educated; second, schools were evaluated on the success of these efforts; and lastly,
the Act provided due process protections for children and families. 89 The financial
incentives provided to enable states and municipalities to comply with these
requirements sought to ensure that the law's goals were effectuated. 90 The IDEA,
80. Id. The Act defined disability broadly "to include any person who has a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such impairment, or is regarded as
having such an impairment." Id.
81. Id.
82. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§1400-1491 (2006 & Supp. 2011)).
83. Id.
84. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 6 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1430.
85. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1).
86. Farley, supra note 47, at 814. The IDEA "included a new mandate for transition services to help older
students transition into post-school education, employment, or independent residential settings." Id.
87. Idatn.44.
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1).
89. THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 10, at 5.
90. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412. States are eligible for federal assistance under the IDEA "if the State submits a
plan that provides assurances to the Secretary that the State has in effect policies and procedures to ensure that
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therefore, is largely a procedural statute,91 passed pursuant to Congress' spending
powers.92
There are three elements that are central to the core principles of the IDEA. The
law requires that states provide students with disabilities (1) a "free appropriate
public education" 93 (2) in the "least restrictive environment,"94 (3) which is
determined through the creation and consideration of an "individualized education
program." 95 However, the IDEA does not specifically define the parameters of these
requirements nor does it establish a hierarchy among them.96 Thus, these components
often exist in competition with one another while courts and legislatures alike have
struggled to determine which condition takes priority.97
B. The Mandates of the IDEA
1. "Free and Appropriate Public Education"
The first of the essential components of the IDEA is the requirement that all
children with disabilities have available to them a free and appropriate public
education.98 Despite appearing to be the very essence of the Act, the IDEA initially
did not expressly define the conditions that would properly constitute a free and
appropriate public education for students with disabilities.99 Regardless of whether
this was the result of an innocent oversight or a deliberate omission, the absence of
specificity generated a great deal of debate over what the requirement entailed as well
as how it relates to the "least restrictive environment" requirement.' In Rowley, the
Supreme Court provided some clarity, defining the free and appropriate public
education requirement as "personalized instruction with sufficient support services
to permit the handicapped child to benefit educationally from that instruction."' 0'
The lower courts have, for the most part, followed the lead of the Supreme Court and
applied the "educational benefit" standard.102
The IDEA presently states that its guarantee of a "free and appropriate public
it meets [the enumerated] conditions." Id.
91. See Anne P. Dupre, Disability and the Public Schools: The Case Against "Inclusion," 72 WASH. L.
REv. 775, 788 n.67 (1997) ("This trend toward procedural rights coincided with the general trend during the
same period that IDEA was enacted toward the use of procedural guarantees as a constraint on government
agencies").
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
93. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).
94. See id. § 1412(a)(5).
95. See id. § 1412(a)(4).
96. Gordon, supra note 15, at 191.
97. Id.
98. Id. § 1412(a)(1). Under the IDEA, special education is defined as "specially designed instruction, at
no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability," and includes "instruction conducted in
the classroom, in the home, in hospitals, and institutions, and in other settings" and "physical education." Id. §
1401(29).
99. Gordon, supra note 15, at 195
100. Id.
101. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 177 (1982).
102. MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATION POLICY AND THE LAW 746 (5th ed., 2012).
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education" requires states to provide such an educational opportunity to all students
with disabilities from age 3 to 21, regardless of the severity of the disability.'03 Such
a guarantee was necessary because, as a 1975 Senate Report indicated, only 3.9
million of the 8 million disabled children were receiving an appropriate education,
despite the prior attempts made by the legislature and judiciary. 104 In the context of
the IDEA, "appropriate" does not mean that schools are required to maximize the
educational opportunities for students with special needs.10 5 Instead, schools must
provide "personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child
to benefit educationally from that instruction." 106
2. "Least Restrictive Environment"
The second fundamental aspect of the IDEA is the mandate that children with
disabilities receive a free and appropriate public education in the least restrictive
environment commensurate with his or her needs.107 This requirement functions as
the legislative endorsement of the integration presumption. The current recitation of
the least restrictive environment provision states:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including
children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are
educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use
of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 08
The "to the maximum extent appropriate" language has been a staple of the least
restrictive environment provision since the law was originally drafted and passed into
law in 1975.109 However, "the Act does not define the least restrictive setting or the
appropriate level of inclusion in a regular educational classroom." 10 Thus, the debate
over inclusion of children with disabilities revolves around the definition of the "least
restrictive environment," and its relationship to a "free and appropriate public
education."
Further contributing to the lack of clarity surrounding the least restrictive
environment provision generally, and the integration presumption more specifically,
is the debate over Congress' reasoning for enacting the provision. There are scholars
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).
104. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432. The Senate Report
further stated that 1.75 million diasabled children were not receiving any educational services at all, and another
2.5 million disabled children were receiving an "inappropriate education." Id
105. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189-190.
106. See id. at 189-203.
107. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5).
108. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
109. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1975).
110. Gordon, supra note 15, at 196.
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who argue that Congress sought to promote the benefits of an integrated education. 111
Those who support this position claim such an intent is evident from the statement of
Senator Robert Stafford: "We are concerned that children with handicapping
conditions be educated in the most normal possible and least restrictive setting, for
how else will they adapt to the world beyond the educational environment, and how
else will the non-handicapped adapt to them?"ll 2
Alternatively, other scholars point to the lack of discussion or debate regarding
the presumption in congressional hearings from 1973 through 1975." For example,
Professor Ruth Colker relies upon the fact that, during the 1973 hearings on the
EAHCA, the draft of the bill then pending in the Senate included a presumption, yet
there was little discussion of the requirement in the congressional reports." 4 mat
little discussion took place was "primarily concerned with the need to provide an
appropriate education to children with disabilities in a non-institutionalized setting;"
senators were "not considering the exact form that education would take within a
public school.""l5 Professor Colker also cites the lack of discussion and debate during
consideration of the Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974 as well as
prior to the passage of the EAHCA in 1975.' 16 Colker concludes that, "based on the
historical context, in which courts were beginning to understand the need to close
disability-only institutions, it appears that Congress was primarily concerned with
using the integration presumption as a vehicle to close disability-only institutions."117
While the Act does not define the least restrictive setting or the appropriate level
of inclusion in a regular educational classroom, regulations promulgated by the DOE
under the IDEA provide guidance for schools and parents. These DOE regulations
require school districts to use "a continuum of alternative placements" as a guide
when placing students with disabilities." 8 The regulations state that "[i]n selecting
the [least restrictive environment], consideration [should be] given to any potential
harmful effect on the child or on the quality of services that he or she needs."1 9 While
the regulations acknowledge that an education in a regular classroom may not be
beneficial or appropriate for each special needs student, the continuum operates under
the presumption that the least restrictive environment for a student with a disability
is in a general education classroom. 1 20 The incorporation of this continuum
emphasizes the significance of "an individualized inquiry and personalized
111. Id
112. Id.
113. Colker, supra note 3, at 805-06.
114. Id. at 805.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 805-06.
117. Id at 806. But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Abolish the Integration Presumption? Not Yet, 156 U. PA. L.
REv. PENNuMBRA 157 (2007); Mark C. Weber, A Nuanced Approach to the Disability Integration
Presumption, 156 U. PA. L REv. 174 (2007).
118. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.55 1(a) (2006). This continuum must range from a default of regular classroom
placement (least restrictive) to a completely segregated institution or hospital (most restrictive). Id. §
300.55 1(b)(1). The school is free to combine or choose intermediate settings along the continuum so as to best
serve the child's individual needs. Id.
119. Id. § 300.552(d).
120. Gordon, supra note 15, at 196-97.
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evaluation" when schools and parents are making the determination of which setting
is the least restrictive for the student.121
3. "Individualized Education Programs"
The third essential element of IDEA is the right for every disabled child to
receive an individualized education program (IEP) designed to meet the child's
specific and unique learning needs. 122 An IEP is a "written statement for each child
with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with [the
IDEA]." 23 The IEP is considered the cornerstone of the IDEA:124 "The purpose of
the IEP is to tailor the education to the child; not tailor the child to the education." 25
In accordance with the procedural nature of IDEA, the IEP requirement obliges
school officials and teachers to meet with the child's parents or guardians to prepare,
as well as annually review, the IEP.126
Given that the IEP provides the basis for a student's placement decision, it is thus
tied intricately to the least restrictive environment requirement. The requirement that
the IEP must contain "a statement of the specific special education and related
services . .. to be provided to the child" 27 and "an explanation of the extent . .. to
which the child will not participate with nondisabled children in the regular class" 28
reinforces the preference for mainstreaming. The development of the IEP promotes
an individualized, child-centered focus to meet the unique needs of each student.
C The Inclusion Debate
The IDEA's mandate that all children with disabilities receive free and
appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment has created an
inherent tension in the debate over educational placement of students with special
needs.129  As some have noted, "[t]his tension implicates the choice between
specialized services and some degree of separate treatment on the one side and
121. Id.
122. See 20 U.S.C. § § 1412(a)(4) (2005).
123. Id. at § 1414(d)(1)(A).
124. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (calling IEP "the centerpiece of the statute's education
delivery system for disabled children").
125. S. REP. No. 105-17, at 24 (1997).
126. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1); see also Keaney, supra note 42, at 833. The IEP must include, at a
minimum:
a statement of the child's present level of educational performance, annual and short-term
instructional goals, specific educational services to be provided, an estimated number of hours the
child will spend in regular education classes, the projected date of initiation and duration of such
services, and appropriate criteria and evaluation schedules for determining whether the stated goals
are being met.
Keaney, supra note 42, at 833.
127. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV).
128. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V).
129. Oberti by Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 (3d. Cir.
1993)
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minimized labeling and minimized segregation on the other."l 30 The tension revolves
around two distinct, yet often confused for synonymous, placement methods,
mainstreaming and inclusion-neither of which encapsulates the least restrictive
environment requirement.
The least restrictive environment formulation is the "mechanism through which
the child's individual needs are matched with a specific educational placement."'31
The specific mechanism employed may adopt aspects of mainstreaming or inclusion,
but they are simply concepts of placement and are very different from one another.132
"Mainstreaming" involves the integration of students with special needs into a
regular education classroom for part of the day for the benefit of social interaction.133
Often, a student will join the regular classroom for non-academic periods, but not
necessarily in all cases; the determination is heavily dependent on an individualized
assessment of the student's abilities and aptitude.134 "Inclusion," on the other hand,
refers to the practice of placing students with special needs in a regular education
classroom for most of the day.135 Similar to mainstreaming, an individualized
assessment of the student is highly determinative for inclusion.136 Full inclusion,
obviously a related method, involves educating students with special needs,
regardless of the severity of their disability, in a regular education classroom based
solely upon the age of the student. 37
In summation, both mainstreaming and inclusion are means by which school
districts may fulfill the least restrictive environment requirement, yet the law does
not explicitly require either.138 Though the IDEA is frequently interpreted by both
scholars and courts as having a clear preference for mainstreaming or inclusion,
issues often arise regarding the degree to which a particular student with special needs
is be integrated, the factors considered in the determination, and the manner in which
those factors are evaluated.139 Additionally, the federal circuit courts and educational
scholars alike are not unanimous in their support for either practice or in the manner
in which they should be employed.140 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has to yet to
consider the least restrictive environment requirement and the accompanying
integration presumption, and thus there is no clear, uniform standard for school
districts to comply with or lower courts to apply.141
130. Id. at 1214 n.18.
131. Gordon, supra note 15, at 198.
132. Id. As author, Anne Dupre, notes in her article, "The inclusion decision does not state to the child:
'We are unable to teach you.' Rather, the inclusion decision is based on a determination that 'we are better able
to teach you in a special classroom."' Anne P. Dupre, Disability, Deference, and the Integrity of Academic
Enterprise, 32 GA. L. REv. 393, 426 (1998).
133. Gordon, supra note 15, at 198.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 198-99. Generally, the homeroom is considered a regular classroom. Id. at 199.
136. Id.
137. Gordon, supra note 15, at 198.
138. See id. at 198-99.
139. See infra Part IV B-D.
140. See infra Part IV B-D.
141. See infra note 147.
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IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF IDEA
The underlying conflict that surrounds the inclusion debate stems from the
discrepancy between what may be an appropriate education and what may be the
most appropriate level of inclusion.142 The issue frequently arises in litigation
regarding placement decisions made under the IDEA as the fact the Act does not
explicitly define the term inclusion necessitates that courts interpret and determine
the parameters of an appropriate education, as well as the least restrictive
environment requirement.143
Over the past thirty years, compliance issues under the IDEA have divided the
circuit courts. 144 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not visited the topic of the
IDEA mandates in over twenty years and has never decided the issue of how to
determine whether a student is receiving services in the least restrictive
environment. 145 The lack of guidance from the highest court has found the federal
circuits developing a myriad of different tests, based on varying interpretations of the
IDEA, which often highlight a strong preference for inclusion, based upon
interpretations of congressional intent behind the enactment of the statute. The harm
that follows from the absence of a uniform standard for interpreting the essential
provisions of the IDEA is obvious: disparate treatment of children with disabilities
based on jurisdiction, as well as different, and perhaps undesirable, factors being
employed to make determinations regarding the placement of special needs students
in regular education classrooms.
A. The Supreme Court Speaks: The Rowley Decision
Decided in 1982, Rowley still stands as the only case the Supreme Court has
heard to date on the substantive provisions of the EAHCAl 46 Although the case was
concerned with addressing the concept and boundaries of a free and appropriate
public education rather than the least restrictive environment, the case has been
consistently interpreted as having established the legal analysis for placement
decisions as well.147
In Rowley, parents of a deaf child brought suit against the local school district,
objecting to the district's refusal to provide a sign language interpreter for their
daughter in the regular education classroom.148 According to the Court, Amy Rowley
had "minimal residual hearing and [was] an excellent lipreader.149 The IEP developed
by the school and Amy's parents provided that Amy should be educated in a regular
142. Gordon, supra note 15, at 199.
143. Id.
144. See infra Part IV B-D.
145. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on the least restrictive environment requirement in Sacramento
City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207
(1994), and Roncker v. Walters, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
146. The EAHCA was not renamed IDEA until 1990.
147. Gordon, supra note 15, at 199.
148. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982).
149. Id. at 184.
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classroom, should use a FM hearing aid, and should receive instruction from a tutor
for the deaf each day and spending three hours a week with a speech therapist. 50 The
Rowley's agreed with elements of the IEP, but were insistent that a sign language
interpreter be placed in all of her academic classes in lieu of the other proposed IEP
measures.15 1 The school district had provided a sign language interpreter the year
before, when Amy was in kindergarten, for a two-week experimental period, but the
interpreter had reported that Amy did not require his services. 152 Based on their
review of the interpreter's report and in consultation with the school district's
Committee on the Handicapped, school administrators concluded that Amy did not
require an interpreter in her first-grade classroom. 5 3
The district court, relying upon the disparity between Amy's academic
achievement and her potential, 154 ruled that she was not receiving a free and
appropriate public education.155 The lower court defined the term "free and
appropriate public education" as "an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children."' 56 A divided panel
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.' 5
The Supreme Court reversed and determined that, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the lower courts, the EAHCA "does expressly define 'free appropriate
public education."'"5 8 However, the Court characterized the statutory definition as
"cryptic." 159 Regardless of whether the definition provided was "functional," the
Court indicated that "it is the principal tool which Congress has given us for parsing
the critical phrase of the Act."l 60 The Court proceeded to then flesh out the definitions
contained in the Act to determine the intent of Congress, eventually concluding that,
"if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 184-85. The school district's Committee on the Handicapped had "received expert evidence
from Amy's parents on the importance of a sign- language [sic] interpreter, received testimony from Amy's
teacher and other persons familiar with her academic and social progress, and visited a class for the deaf." Id
at 185.
154. See id. The district court found that, despite the fact that Amy was performing above average
academically compared to her non-disabled peers, "she understands considerably less of what goes on in class
than she could if she were not deaf' and was "not learning as much, or performing as well academically, as she
would without her handicap." Id
155. Id. at 185-86.
156. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F.Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). According to the lower court, "such
a standard 'requires that the potential of the handicapped child be measured and compared to his or her
performance, and that the resulting differential or 'shortfall' be compared to the shortfall experienced by non-
handicapped children."' Rowley, 458 U.S. at 186.
157. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 186.
158. Id. at 187-88. As the Court note, the IDEA defines "free appropriate public education" as "special
education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate
preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity
with the individualized education program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title." 20 U.S.C. §1401(18)
(1975) (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 188.
160. Id.
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permit the child to benefit from the instruction, . . . the child is receiving a 'free
appropriate education' as defined by the Act."l61
In reaching this conclusion (and providing a functional framework for
understanding the free and appropriate public education requirement), the Court
succeeded in delineating both the requirements of the EAHCAl6 2 as well as the role
of the courts in litigating such matters. The Court ruled that Amy did not have a right
to a sign language interpreter, 163 and concluded that the EAHCA does not require
states to maximize the potential of a student with special needs' 6 4-rather states must
only provide "a basic floor of opportunity."l 65 Furthermore, and of particular
importance for the subsequent litigation of the "least restrictive environment"
requirement, the Court emphasized that "[t]he primary responsibility for formulating
the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational
method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the Act to state and local
educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child."1 66 The
Court cautioned reviewing courts not "to substitute their own notions of sound
educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review."167
Finally, the Court announced a two-part test for reviewing state compliance with
the provisions of the EAHCA:
First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And
second, is the individualized educational program developed through the
Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits? If these requirements are met, the State has complied
with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no
more. 168
B. The Jurisprudence of the Integration Presumption
While the Supreme Court did not directly address the issues of mainstreaming or
inclusion in Rowley, it did provide a framework for the role courts should play in the
placement process. 169 The Court's deferential approach in that case to placement
decisions made by local school boards, however, has been subsequently limited by a
number of federal circuit court decisions, which have determined that Rowley only
applies in circumstances where the appropriateness of educational methods are being
161. Id.at 189.
162. As aforementioned, this was the original name given to the IDEA. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
163. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209-10.
164. Id. at 198.
165. See id at 200-01.
166. Id. at 207.
167. Id. at 206. The Court explained that "[t]he very importance which Congress has attached to compliance
with certain procedures in the preparation of an IEP would be frustrated if a court were permitted simply to set
state decisions at nought." Id.
168. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07.
169. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
236 [Vol 40:1
How Mainstreaming Presumption Became Inclusion Mandate
challenged under the IDEA.170 As a result, federal appeals courts have established a
variety of guidelines for educational placement for students with special needs.171
These courts have tended to fall into one of two groups: those emphasizing the
integration presumption above all else, and those who prioritize deference to the
determinations made by local school boards.
C. Circuits Emphasizing the Presumption
1. Roncker v. Walter
In 1983, the Sixth Circuit was presented with the first opportunity to address the
issue of integration. In Roncker v. Walter,172 parents of a special needs student,
characterized by the court as "severely mentally retarded,"' 73 challenged the local
school district's decision to place their son in a "county" school, a separate institution
solely for students with disabilities who were completely segregated from their non-
disabled peers.174 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit declined to apply the Rowley test.175
Based on their belief in a strong congressional preference for mainstreaming, the
court decided that the Rowley two-step inquiry should not apply when placement of
a child within the "least restrictive environment" is in question, as it was the case in
Roncker. 176The court distinguished Rowley on the determination that the present
matter concerned the adequacy of the mainstreaming process itself, whereas the
Rowley standards were limited in application to cases involving a controversy
regarding the appropriate methods for educating a special needs student. 77
The Sixth Circuit proceeded to develop its own test, declaring, "In a case where
a segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine whether the
services which make that placement superior can feasibly be provided in a non-
segregated setting. If they can, the placement in the segregated school would be
inappropriate under the Act."17 8 To determine feasibility, the court adopted a
balancing approach. While continuing to emphasize the strong congressional
preference for mainstreaming, the court held that the benefits of placement in a
segregated institution must "far outweigh" any marginal benefits that would be
received from mainstreaming."7
170. See infra Part IV C-D.
171. See infra Part IV C-D.
172. 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983).
173. Id. at 1060.
174. See id. at 1060-61. County schools received "part of their funding through tuition for individual
students, which is paid for by the school district." Id. They also receive from the state "by virtue of a mental
retardation tax levy[,]" which is not available to public schools. Id.
175. Id. at 1061.
176. 700 F.2d at 1062. ("In the present case, the question ... involves a determination of whether the school
district has satisfied the Act's requirement that handicapped children be educated alongside non-handicapped
children to the maximum extent appropriate.") (emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1063.
179. See id. ("Framing the issue in this manner accords the proper respect for the strong preference in favor
of mainstreaming while still realizing the possibility that some handicapped children simply must be educated
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Interestingly, the court in Roncker identified cost as an appropriate factor to be
considered in analyzing feasibility, though it is no defense when "the school district
has failed to use its funds to provide a proper continuum of alternative placements
for handicapped children."' 80 The court then remanded the case to the district court
to consider whether the school could provide the services in a more integrated setting
rather than in a segregated facility. 181 Prior to 1997 and the amendments made to the
IDEA, both the Eighth and the Fourth Circuits applied the Roncker test in subsequent
rulings.182
2. Daniel R.R. v. State Board ofEducation
The Fifth Circuit was presented with its first opportunity to consider
mainstreaming in Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education.183 That case involved
parents of a six year old, Daniel, challenging the El Paso Independent School
District's decision to place Daniel in a special education classroom.184 The school
district had previously determined that for his pre-kindergarten placement, Daniel,
who was a victim of Downs Syndrome, would spend half of his day in a special
education classroom and half in a regular classroom.185 However, after Daniel had
been in the regular classroom for a few weeks, the regular classroom teacher "began
to have reservations about Daniel's presence in her class." 86 According to his regular
classroom teacher, Mrs. Norton, "Daniel did not participate without constant,
individual attention from the teacher or her aide, and failed to master any of the skills
Mrs. Norton was trying to teach her students." 8 7 Thus, in November of that year, the
school district decided to change Daniel's placement plan.' 8 8 In the new plan, Daniel
would be educated exclusively in the special education classroom and would only
have contact with his non-disabled peers at recess every day and at lunch three days
a week, "if his mother was present to supervise him." 89 Daniel's parents, after
appealing to a hearing officer, filed an action against the school district in district
court.190 The district court "rel[ied] primarily on Daniel's inability to receive an
educational benefit in [a] regular education" classroom, affirming the altered
in segregated facilities either because the handicapped child would not benefit from mainstreaming, because
any marginal benefits received from mainstreaming are far outweighed by the benefits gained from services
which could not feasibly be provided in the non-segregated setting, or because the handicapped child is a
disruptive force in the non-segregated setting.")
180. Id.
181. Roncker700F.2d,at 1062.
182. See, e.g. A.W. v. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1987); Devries v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989).
183. 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
184. Id. at 1039-40.
185. Id. at 1039.
186. Id.
187. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1039.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1039-40.
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placement plan. 191
Like the Sixth Circuit, the court in Daniel R.R. declined to apply the Rowley test.
The Fifth Circuit found that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the EAHCA failed
to "add substance to the Act's vague terms," and that "instruction specifically
designed to meet each student's unique needs [was] as imprecise a directive as the
language actually found in the Act." 92 Additionally, the court in Daniel R.R.
declined to follow the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Roncker.'93 The Fifth Circuit found
that the Roncker test "necessitates too intrusive an inquiry into the educational policy
choices that Congress deliberately left to state and local officials" and "makes little
reference to the language of the [Act]."' 94
Upon rejecting these approaches and the district court's approach,195 the court
articulated its own two-part test for determining if inclusive placements comply with
the mainstreaming requirement of the EAHCA.1 96 First, the court must determine
"whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and
services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given child." 97 If the court determines
that education in a regular classroom cannot be achieved and "the school intends to
either provide special education or to remove the child from regular education," the
second prong of the test requires the court to ask, "whether the school has
mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate."98
Characterizing their test as an "individualized, fact-specific inquiry," 99 the court
then proceeded to discuss potential factors that could be considered when faced with
the mainstreaming issue.200 The factors discussed by the Fifth Circuit included: (1)
"whether the state has taken steps to accommodate the handicapped child in regular
education;" 201 (2) if the state had taken steps to accommodate the disabled child,
whether those efforts were sufficient;202 (3) "whether the child will receive an
educational benefit from regular education;" 203 (4) "the child's overall educational
experience in the mainstreamed environment, balancing the benefits of regular and
special education for each individual child;" 204 and (5) "what effect the handicapped
child's presence has on the regular classroom environment, and thus, on the education
that other students are receiving." 205
In the course of its analysis, the court emphasized the social, nonacademic
191. Id. at 1040.
192. Daniel R.R. 874 F.2d at 1044.
193. Id. at 1046.
194. Id.
195. Id
196. Id. at 1048.
197. Daniel R.R. 874 F.2d at 1048.
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1048-50.
201. Id. at 1048.
202. Daniel R.R. 874 F.2d at 1048.
203. Id. at 1049.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1049-50.
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benefits of mainstreaming.206 Stating, "academic achievement is not the only purpose
of mainstreaming," 207 the court focused on the "overall growth and development
benefits gained from education." 208 Ultimately, the possible social benefit "may tip
the balance in favor of mainstreaming," even absent a clear educational benefit to the
disabled child.209 However, the court's emphasis on the social benefits of
mainstreaming was counterbalanced by its understanding of the potentially negative
impacts associated with mainstreaming. Thus, the Fifth Circuit's test does not require
schools to provide every conceivable supplementary aid or service to assist the child,
only that schools make a genuine effort to modify and supplement their curriculum
to reach the disabled child placed in a regular classroom.210 The Daniel R.R. court
also gave sufficient consideration to the potential negative impact that placement of
a student with special needs would have on the other students in the class, for
example, if the placement forced the teacher to focus her attention on one child to the
detriment of the entire class.211
Applying this test to the facts of the case, the court found that Daniel commanded
most of the teacher's attention and received little, if any, benefit from the regular
classroom. 212 According to the court, these factors, among others, pointed toward
special education placement.213 The court proceeded then to the second part of its test
to evaluate whether Daniel had been mainstreamed to the maximum extent possible.
Despite rejecting the district court's analysis, the court agreed with the holding of the
lower court that Daniel had been mainstreamed to the fullest extent possible and,
therefore, upheld his new placement plan.214
Despite upholding Daniel's placement in a special education classroom, the
DanielR.R. opinion's positive focus on mainstreaming was plainly evident. The court
noted that "educational benefits are not mainstreaming's only virtue. Rather,
mainstreaming may have benefits in and of itself. For example, the language and
behavior models available from non-handicapped children may be essential or
helpful to the handicapped child's development."215 Other courts have adopted and
borrowed similar language to support inclusionary placements. 216
3. Adoption and Refinement of the Daniel R.R. Test
In the years following the ruling in Daniel R.R., the Eleventh, the Third, and the
206. Id at 1047.
207. Daniel R.R. 874 F.2d at 1049.
208. Id. at 1047, n.8.
209. Id. at 1049.
210. Id. at 1048. (Re
211. Farley, supra note 47, at 824-825.
212. Daniel R.R. 874 F.2d at 1050.
213. Id. at 1051.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1047-48. The court then stated, "In other words, although a handicapped child may not be able
to absorb all of the regular education curriculum, he may benefit from nonacademic experiences in the regular
education environment." Id. at 1048.
216. See, e.g., Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ.,
995 F.2d 1204, 1216-17 (3d Cir. 1993).
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Ninth Circuits each adopted and refined the Fifth Circuit's two-prong test. The
Eleventh Circuit, in Greer v. Rome City School District,217 incorporated a comparison
of the educational benefits of the general education classroom with special aids and
services to those available in a special education classroom to determine which
educational environment was the appropriate placement. 218 Further, building on the
Daniel R.R. tradition of evaluating the educational effects of placements on non-
disabled students in the classroom, yet placing greater emphasis on the congressional
preference for mainstreaming rather than deference to the determinations made by
the school board and lower courts, the court in Greer concluded that, "[a]
handicapped child who merely requires more teacher attention than most other
children is not likely to be so disruptive as to significantly impair the education of
other children."219  The Eleventh Circuit stated that, in order to satisfy the
requirements of the IDEA, the school district must consider a range of alternative
educational methods regarding appropriate placement of a student with special needs,
and that only considering education in special education classroom was not
sufficient.220
Following the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Greer, the Third Circuit
subsequently held that school districts have an affirmative obligation to consider the
placement of students with special needs in a general educational environment before
exploring alternative placements.221 Specifically, the court stated, "even if a child
with disabilities cannot be educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom, that child
must still be included in school programs with non-disabled students wherever
possible." 222 The Oberti decision was thus the first to identify and underscore the
reciprocal benefits of mainstreaming for students without disabilities, such as
learning to communicate and interact with students with disabilities. 223 Additionally,
the Third Circuit placed the burden of proving compliance with the IDEA on the
school board.224 Furthermore, the court greatly emphasized a presumption in favor
of mainstreaming which could only be overcome by evidence demonstrating that the
student with special needs will receive little or no benefit from the placement, or if
the child is so disruptive that the other students' educational experiences are
"significantly impaired."225 Yet the court favored inclusion in this case despite the
student's well-documented history of behavioral disruptions. 226
217. 950 F.2d 688 (1lth Cir. 1991). In Greer, the court assessed the educational placement of a ten-year
old girl with Downs Syndrome. Id. The parents of the ten-year old girl contested their daughter's placement in
a self-contained special education classroom. Id. at 689.
218. Id. at 696-97.
219. Id. at 697 (emphasis added).
220. See id. at 698-99.
221. Oberti ex rel. Oberti v. Bd. OfEduc., 995 F.2d 1204, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993) ("If the school has given no
serious consideration to including the child in a regular class with such supplementary aids and services and
to modifying the regular curriculum to accommodate the child, then it has most likely violated the Act's
mainstreaming directive.").
222. Id. at 1215.
223. Id. at n.24.
224. Id. at 1219.
225. Id. at 1217.
226. Id. at 1223. The court stated that the student "would not have had such severe behavior problems had
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In Sacramento City Unified School District v. Rachel H.,227 the Ninth Circuit
continued the trend towards full inclusion.228 The decision incorporated factors from
the Roncker, Daniel R.R., and Greer line of cases, resulting in a four-factor balancing
test that the court used to ascertain the appropriate educational placement of a student
with special needs. 229 The four factors included: "(1) the educational benefits of
placement in full-time in a regular class; (2) the non-academic benefits of such
placement; (3) the effect of [the disabled student] had on the teacher and children in
the regular class; and (4) the cost of mainstreaming [the disabled student]."230
D. Circuits Prioritizing Deference
The holdings and analyses of the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits on
the mainstreaming issue reflect a jurisprudential determination that greater weight
should be accorded to the congressional placement for mainstreaming (rather than
the Supreme Court's deferential approach to the decisions made by local school
boards and lower courts on the issue). However, based upon well-established
principles of interpretation, the degree of deference to which the Supreme Court in
Rowley afforded local school boards should have been applied to judicial
interpretation of the IDEA as a whole. That is, regardless of the fact that subsequent
circuit court decisions limited the holding of Rowley to the issue of what constitutes
a "free and appropriate education" under IDEA, the circuits should have afforded the
same degree of deference to the decisions made by local school boards regarding
their interpretation of the "least restrictive environment" provision of the Act. The
circuit court opinions discussed in the prior section each allude to the deference which
is supposed to be afforded to local school boards231; yet, in establishing their own
tests for the mainstreaming issue, each circuit systematically ignored the decisions
and findings by the schools, districts, and district courts in the application of those
tests.
Other circuits, however, have accorded greater deference to the judgments made
at the local level. While still recognizing the congressional preference for
mainstreaming, these courts tend to give equal weight to determinations made by
school districts,232 adhering to the Supreme Court's guidance in Rowley that courts
should not "substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the
school authorities which they review." 233 This section will examine two cases that
follow this approach.
he been provided with adequate supplemental aids and services." Id.
227. 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
228. See id. at 1403 ("we hold only, under our standard of review, that the school district's decision was a
reasonable one under the circumstances of this case. More importantly, the Dis- trict's proposition that Rachel
must be taught by a special education teacher runs directly counter to the congressional preference that children
with disabilities be educated in regular classes with children who are not disabled.").
229. Id. at 1404.
230. Id. at 1404.
231. See supra Part IV.C.
232. Id.
233. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
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1. Hartmann v. Loudoun County Board ofEducation
In Hartmann v. Loudoun Country Board of Education,234 the Fourth Circuit
applied an approach much more deferential to the decisions of educators and
administrators regarding the placement of students with special needs. Hartmann
involved a challenge by the parents of an eleven-year-old autistic child, Mark, to the
school district's proposed placement plan, which the Hartmanns' believed failed to
comply with the integration provision of the IDEA.235 In kindergarten, Mark's spent
half his day in a self-contained program for autistic students and the other part of his
day in a regular education classroom. 236 Presumably based on his successes that year,
the school amended Mark's placement for first-grade and placed in a regular
education classroom for the entire day, albeit with a full-time aide to assist him.237
The Hartmanns moved from Illinois to Loudoun County, Virginia after Mark's first
grade year.238
Upon their move to Loudoun County, the Hartmann's enrolled Mark at a new
school, Ashburn Elementary, for his second-grade year.239 Based on his IEP from his
previous school, Ashburn Elementary placed Mark in a regular education
classroom.24 0 To facilitate Mark's inclusion in a regular classroom, school officials
"carefully selected his teacher, hired a full-time aide to assist him, and put him in a
smaller class[room]" with students characterized as "more independent." 24' Halfway
through the year, school officials assigned a special education teacher to provide
Mark with three hours of instruction per week and to advise Mark's teacher and
aide.242 Despite these accommodations, the school was unable to adequately manage
Mark's behavior, which included "daily episodes of loud screeching and other
disruptive conduct such as hitting, pinching, kicking, biting, and removing his
clothing."243 Mark's outbursts had a detrimental effect on both Mark and his
classmates, requiring his teacher and aide to divert their attention to calming and
redirecting Mark and requiring additional time to get the rest of the class back on
track after the disruption.244
By the end of Mark's second-grade year, the IEP team concluded that he was
234. 118 F.3d 996 (4th Cir. 1997).
235. Id. at 999-1000.
236. Id. at 999.
237. Id. Mark did receive speech and occupational therapy each week, but, aside from that, he was included
in a regular classroom. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. Similar to his previous placement, Mark also received speech and language therapy from a qualified
specialist five hours per week. Id.
241. Id. The court notes that "Mark's teacher. . . read extensively about autism, and both [his teacher and
his aide]. . . received training in facilitated communication, a special communication technique used with
autistic children." Id Additionally, the Loudoun County Director of Special Education personally worked with
Mark's IEP team, and provided in-service training for the Ashburn Elementary staff on autism and inclusion of
disabled children in regular classrooms. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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making no academic progress in the regular classroom.245 Therefore, the decided to
amend his IEP for his third-grade year, placing him in a class specifically structured
for autistic children at another school, Leesburg Elementary. 246 Unlike similar
facilities in prior cases, specifically Roncker, Leesburg Elementary was not a
segregated facility; rather, it was a regular elementary school that housed a class for
autistic children "in order to facilitate interaction between the autistic children and
the students who were not handicapped." 247 Under the proposed IEP, Mark would
still be placed in a regular classroom for art, music, physical education, library, and
recess. 248 Furthermore, "the Leesburg program. . . would have permitted Mark to
increase the portion of his instruction received in a regular education setting as he
demonstrated an improved ability to handle it."249
The Hartmann's refused to accept the proposed IEP and brought a legal
challenge, claiming that the proposed IEP did not comply with the mainstreaming
provision of the IDEA because Mark would not have been included in a regular
classroom "to the maximum extent appropriate." 250 The hearing officer upheld the
proposed IEP but was ultimately reversed by the district court, which "concluded that
Mark could receive significant educational benefit in a regular classroom."251 Most
notably, the district court found that, based on the strong presumption in favor of
inclusion under the IDEA, disruptive behavior should not be a significant factor when
school officials are determining the appropriate educational placement for a disabled
child.252
The Fourth Circuit reversed the ruling of the district court.253 Citing Rowley for
the proposition that the task of education belongs to the educators, the court stated
that federal courts must give deference to the determinations made at the local
level.254 Further, the court emphasized that the IDEA establishes "a basic floor of
opportunity"255 for every student with special needs,256 and that "the IDEA's
mainstreaming provision establishes a presumption, not an inflexible federal
mandate."257 The court relied on Section 1412(5)(B) of the Act258 for the limiting
principle of the "maximum extent appropriate" requirement. 259 Moreover, the court
245. Id. at 1000.
246. Id.
247. Id. As noted by the court, "[t]he Leesburg class would have included five autistic children working
with a special education teacher and at least one full-time aide." Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. The district court also found "that 'the Board simply did not take enough appropriate steps to try
to include Mark in a regular class."' Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1005.
254. Id. at 1000.
255. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201
256. Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1001.
257. Id.
258. Codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2004).
259. See id. Section 1412(5)(B) states that mainstreaming is not appropriate "when the nature or severity
of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot
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found that the district court had deserted Fourth Circuit precedent for when
mainstreaming is not required.260 The court had previously held in in DeVries v.
Fairfax County School Board26' that mainstreaming is not required where:
(1) the disabled child would not receive an educational benefit from
mainstreaming into a regular class; (2) any marginal benefit from
mainstreaming would be significantly out- weighed by benefits which
could feasibly be obtained only in a separate instructional setting; or, (3)
the disabled child is a disruptive force in a regular classroom setting. 262
In reviewing the district court's analysis, the court essentially accused the lower court
of doing what the Supreme Court had explicitly prohibited in Rowley - substituting
their own beliefs about sound educational policy for those of Mark's IEP team.263
The court gave considerable weight to the efforts the school district went through to
try and educate Mark in a regular classroom.264 The evidence demonstrated to the
court that, despite the efforts taken by Ashburn Elementary to mainstream Mark,
Mark was not receiving any benefits in a regular classroom since he was not making
academic progress, and therefore, a special classroom was an appropriate
placement.265
The Fourth Circuit's decision can be seen primarily as a re-balancing of the
integration presumption, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Rowley. The court
makes clear that, in this circuit, weight should be given to the congressional
preference for mainstreaming, and deference should be afforded to the judgments
made by local educators. Aside from this determination, the Fourth Circuit's analysis
was similar to those conducted by other circuits in the previous section:2 66 the court
compared the potential benefits a student would receive in a special education
classroom with those received in a regular classroom, and also considered the social
benefits derived from mainstreaming. However, the court limited prior
considerations of the social benefit, finding that "[a]ny such benefits, however,
cannot outweigh his failure to progress academically in the regular classroom."267
2. Beth B. v. Van Clay
A more recent Seventh Circuit decision adopted an approach similar to the one
be achieved satisfactorily." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1990).
260. See Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1001.
261. 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989).
262. Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1001.
263. See id. ("In effect, the [district] court simply substituted its own judgment regarding Mark's proper
educational program for that of local school officials.")
264. See id. at 1003, 1005. The court called in to question the district court's decision in this regard, stating
that "[t]he district court's conclusion in remarkable of the extensive measures taken on Mark's behalf." Id. at
1003.
265. Id. at 1005.
266. See supra Part V.C.
267. Id. at 1002.
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employed by the Fourth Circuit in Hartmann. In Beth B. v. Van Clay,268 parents of a
thirteen-year old student suffering from Rett Syndrome sued the school district,
alleging that their daughter's placement in a special education classroom was in
violation of the IDEA. 269 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the school district, upholding the school district's decision to keep Beth in a special
education environment. 270
The Seventh Circuit emphasized the importance of deferring to the findings of
the administrative hearing officer since "school authorities are better suited than are
federal judges to determine educational policy."271 The court cited the Supreme
Court's decision in Rowley,272 which stated that "Congress recognized that regular
classrooms simply would not be a suitable setting for the education of many
handicapped children." 273 Based upon this guidance for ascertaining the "to the
maximum extent appropriate" element of the least restrictive environment
requirement, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.274
V. CONGRESSIONAL REVISIONS TO THE IDEA
A. 1997Amendments
Given the dissimilar treatment of the IDEA at the federal circuit level, Congress
amended the law in 1997 in an effort to provide greater clarity and strength.275 These
amendments, and the DOE regulations that followed, further emphasized the
congressional preference for mainstreaming. In fact, it was in these amendments that
the explicit term "least restrictive environment" appeared for the first time within the
text of the law. 276 The stated focus of these amendments was to improve the teaching
and learning experiences of children with disabilities so that they could lead more
"productive independent adult lives." 277 Congress's sought "to strengthen the least
restrictive environment requirement and participation of children with disabilities in
the general curriculum and regular education classroom." 278
The secondary goal of the amendments was to strengthen the role of families in
268. 282 F.3d 493 (2002).
269. Id. at 496. Rett Syndrome is "a neurological disorder that almost exclusively affects girls," and causes
severe cognitive and physical disabilities. Id. at 495. Beth was nonverbal and restricted to a wheelchair as a
result of this disease. Id. According to experts, Beth had "the cognitive ability of an twelve-to-eighteen month
old infant." Id
270. Id.
271. Id. at 496.
272. Id at 499.
273. Rowley, 458 U.S. at n.4.
274. Beth B., 282 F.3d at 499.
275. PuB. L. No. 105-17, 111 STAT. 37 (1997).
276. See Jean B. Crockett, The Least Restrictive Environment and the 1997 IDEA Amendments and Federal
Regulations, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 543, 552 (1999) ("With the 1997 Amendments to the Act, the words 'least
restrictive environment' have officially been transferred from the federal regulations into the statute.").
277. S. REP. No. 105-17, at 5 (1997).
278. 143 CONG. REC. E951-01 (daily ed. May 19, 1997) (statement of Rep. George Miller).
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the special education process. 279 This goal was effectuated by requiring that parents
be included in any discussion regarding potential changes to their child's
placement,280 and mandating that parents are "regularly informed" of their child's
progress towards the stated goals of the IEP.28 1 Further, if it could be determined that
the child was so capable, the Amendments guaranteed students the opportunity to
participate in the planning and placement process as members of their own IEP
team.282 In effect, the 1997 Amendments both "prenewed the importance of the [least
restrictive environment] provision by providing that the regular classroom must be
the default placement and emphasized the role of parent and student input into the
decision-making process." 283
The DOE regulations promulgated in 1999 for the implementation of the 1997
Amendments reinforced these priorities. Of particular importance is the requirement
that the default placement on the "continuum of alternative placements" 284 must be
the regular classroom.285 Along with this default placement requirement, the
regulations further stipulate that, if a disabled student is not able to be mainstreamed,
they must still be included with their regular education classmates for non-academic
activities, such as lunch and recess, to the maximum extent appropriate.2 86 Thus, the
1997 Amendments to the IDEA and subsequent DOE regulations seemed to endorse
and further the position taken by the Third, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuit-that
great weight should be given to the congressional preference for mainstreaming.
Ultimately, the 1997 Amendments did not substantially change the IDEA; rather they
provided a precursor to the more extensive revisions of the 2004 Reauthorization. 287
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE INTEGRATION PRESUMPTION
Today, the vast majority of scholars and policymakers agree that students with
disabilities benefit from inclusion in an educational environment. 288 The debate,
however, focuses on the extent to which they should be integrated, and the manner
in which the level of inclusion should be evaluated.289 The integration presumption
of the IDEA has served an important function in shifting the education of children
with disabilities from segregated facilities to regular schools. Yet, the IDEA, the
279. See S. REP. No. 105-17, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 3 (1997).
280. S. REP. No. 105-17, at 23-24.
281. Id. at 22.
282. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(vii) (1997).
283. Farley, supra note 47, at 817.
284. See supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
285. See Farley, supra note 47, at 818. ("Before a child can be placed outside of the regular classroom, 'the
full range of supplementary aids and services that if provided would facilitate the student's placement in the
regular classroom setting must be considered."')
286. Id.
287. This note does not discuss the reauthorization of the IDEA in 2004. Briefly though, the 2004
Reauthorization shifted the focus of the IDEA from individual-based decision-making to accountability.
Gordon, supra note 15, at 216. The Reauthorization places a "high priority" on standardized test scores and
accountability measures that every child, regardless of disability, must meet. Id.
288. See supra Part I.B.2.
289. See supra Part III.B.2.
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Supreme Court, and the federal circuits have all proven unable to develop a sufficient
evaluation method for determining and reviewing the placement of students with
disabilities given their individual needs.
Going forward, it is the recommendation of this article that courts and Congress
provide equal weight to the integration presumption as well as the decisions made at
the local level by individual educators and school boards. In regards to
mainstreaming, the goal should be to place a student with special needs in the regular
classroom as frequently as possible. The "benefit" model should be used for
determining whether the placement is appropriate, but it should be amended to be
considered in two separate contexts: once for academic classes and activities, and
once for non-academic classes and activities. This bifurcated analysis would provide
a solution to the debate of whether to consider educational or social benefits when
determining the benefit received. Such an inquiry would, first, incorporate the second
prong of the test established in Daniel R.R.,290 but would apply the test using the
factors outlined in Rachel H., 2 9 and, unlike the decision rendered by the Oberti court,
would place the burden of proving that the school was not in compliance with the
IDEA on the parents or guardians challenging their placement.
The proposed framework would focus on the degree to which the school has
mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate. Absent a showing that a
school or school district willfully sought to intentionally segregate students with
special needs, this is the analysis that should apply. In the course of this evaluation,
a court should consider: (1) the educational benefit available in a regular classroom
with supplemental aids and services, compared to the benefits of a special education
classroom; (2) the non-academic benefits of interaction with non-disabled students;
(3) the impact of the student with a disability on the teach and other children in the
regular classroom; and (4) the cost of the supplementary aids and services required
for mainstreaming the student.292 In considering the potential impact a student with
special needs might have on a regular classroom, disruptive behavior should certainly
be considered. In addition, the court should focus on the degree to which the school
re-evaluates the placement of students with special needs, and whether the students
that have made progress both academically and socially are being mainstreamed to a
greater extent. Finally, significant deference should be given to the determinations
made by the school board, provided they have mainstreamed the student in most non-
academic programs.
This new analysis would improve the clarity of the law while ensuring students
with special needs receive a valuable educational experience. In the context of special
education, since the adoption of the IDEA, schools have consistently sought
compliance with the federal mandate despite the ambiguous and wavering standards
they had to meet. Deference should be afforded to their determinations. Once again,
as the Supreme Court declared in Rowley:
The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a
290. See supra Part IV.C.2.
291. See infran.295.
292. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994).
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handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable
to the child's needs, was left by [IDEA] to state and local agencies in
cooperation with the parents or guardians of the child... [Reviewing courts
should not] substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for
those of the school authorities which they review.293
The framework proposed in this Note would return the integration presumption
to its intended function and object: mainstreaming. The evaluation should thus be
individually focused, mainstreaming to the fullest extent that the student is capable
and comfortable. Older students should be included in this conversation. Of equal
importance is that schools give students with special needs the opportunity to advance
the degree to which they are mainstreamed and included in regular classrooms based
on their development and academic success. Unique and innovative mainstreaming
solutions adopted at the local level should be celebrated. The education of children
with special needs has become a priority for the public school systems throughout
the country. It is the judiciary's role to ensure that schools remain in compliance with
the federal mandate of IDEA, yet have the flexibility and deference generally
afforded in the education context in order for the system to be most effective.
293. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207.
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